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Abstract  
Distributed information systems (DIS) are 
free and open systems, characterized by their 
non-locality. Security for DIS, is a higher or-
der activity, related to issues as data integrity 
and interoperability among complex hetero-
geneous systems. This proposed holistic secu-
rity approach requires category theory. Secu-
rity entities and distributed activities e.g. dis-
tributed transactions, in a DIS, are expressed 
as Cartesian Closed Categories and adjoint 
functors between them, following a four-level 
modular approach.
 
 
1 Security in DIS 
Security is increasingly important in modern distri-
buted information systems; they are exposed to a 
growing number and a wider variety of threats and 
vulnerabilities. It is related to interoperability and is-
sues of integrity [Shuey and Spooner, 1997]. General-
ly, it can be achieved by securing the processes and the 
channels used for their interactions as well as by pro-
tecting the resources against unauthorized access 
[Doughty, 2003]. 
Information security requirements correspond to 
specific security policies; each security policy is mate-
rialized through a specific security service, which in 
turn is implemented using one or more security me-
chanisms as countermeasures against specific security 
attacks (Figure 1). 
2 Interoperability Issues 
In today’s global environments, which are based on 
non-local activities as in distributed information sys-
tems, interoperable systems are free and open [Rossi-
ter and Heather, 2006]. Interoperability itself is a 
global requirement. In the context of information sys-
tems, it is concerned with the inter-communication of 
data at different and therefore usually heterogeneous 
localities. 
In modern heterogeneous interoperable systems, 
higher-order operations are needed, as the same condi-
tions applied in different systems may lead to unpre-
dictable results. Interoperability as it is higher-order 
cannot be handled in a complete and decidable manner 
by axiomatic methods such as first order predicate 
calculus [Gödel, 1930].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Security in distributed information system 
3 The Problem 
Current security approaches are characterized by their 
locality. They can be seen as first-order activities. Bot-
tom-up approaches, such as risk analysis [Coles and 
Moulton, 2003;Smith and Eloff, 2002;Reid and Floyd, 
2001] are subjective; these are more suited to high-
level security risks. On the other hand, top-down ap-
proaches (e.g. baseline approaches), such as ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 Specification [ISO, 2005b] and the 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Code of Practice [ISO, 2005a], 
leave the choice of control to the user; they are most 
appropriate for low-level security risks. 
Organizations usually respond to security threats on 
a piecemeal basis following hardware and software 
solutions that inevitably leave gaps and generate in-
consistencies, which can be exploited by intruders. A 
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promising solution is to include security considera-
tions as core processes of the DIS itself. 
A complete security strategy needs to be layered to 
deal with issues such as continuity strategies (threat 
assessment, risk evaluation & control), security poli-
cies, incident response plan, host-based & network-
based perimeter and/or perimeterless detection, audit-
ing procedures, fault tolerance and recovery strategies, 
anti-malware control (intrusion detection, router and 
firewall security, anti-virus control) as well as legal 
and regulatory compliance [Stallings, 2002;Moitra and 
Konda, 2004;Hawkins et al., 2000]. 
Design for security has very special methodological 
problems. Risk management itself a very inexact 
science, even though it relies very heavily on mathe-
matical techniques, usually applies statistical or prob-
abilistic expectation at a confidence level based on 
some model.  Such methods are being applied more 
and more widely in both private and public enterprises. 
However when the issue is security, reliance on just 
probability is often inadequate and even at times mea-
ningless. A system is not secure unless impenetrable. 
Even if some probabilistic failure in security is tolera-
ble, the sources and types of possible breaches still 
need to be known precisely. Therefore an analysis of 
any such system needs to be fully formal. The lan-
guages of systems analysis do not normally exhibit 
this feature.  The diagram we have given in Figure 1 
illustrates this point.  Text in boxes like 'requirement', 
'policy', 'mechanism', 'service', 'attack' and 'channel', 
all need formal definition. However the arrows be-
tween the boxes are not formal functions.  Distributed 
information systems may well depend on relations that 
are not many to one. Thus one to many is outside the 
ordinary definition of a function and causes difficulties 
even in simple relational databases at the local level. 
This is where category theory can be introduced 
with great success. Category theory provides a lan-
guage for diagrams that is as formal as an algebraic 
expression. Because a category is a class consisting of 
arrows between objects it also provides a much greater 
power than functions between sets. A further important 
property of a category is that it is of the nature of a 
type. Categories can then provide in a natural fashion 
the concept of different levels which is implied in Fig-
ure 1 but which cannot be made explicitly clear be-
cause of the limitations of the language used there. A 
set theoretic approach is basically a flat one where to 
express types and levels soon becomes unnecessarily 
complicated. 
4 The Proposed Holistic Approach 
A holistic approach with natural closure seems neces-
sary to describe a complete and global view. It em-
braces all these aspects of security, including systems 
architecture, policies, procedures and user education 
providing natural closure with a very high degree of 
certainty based on the CIA security principles [FIPS, 
2003] (namely confidentiality, integrity and availabili-
ty). It focuses on securing the infrastructure itself by 
forcing users to adopt best security practices while 
ensuring that the network is ‘secure by design’ rather 
than by post-rational customization. Nevertheless, it is 
crucial that any solution must remain simple to imple-
ment as well as simple to use from an end-user pers-
pective.  
4.1 Category Theory and o-o Paradigm 
In the context of DIS, components extend the object-
oriented paradigm by enabling objects to manage the 
interfaces they present and discover those presented by 
others. The object-oriented approach needs to be 
founded in applied category theory to be complete and 
decidable [Barr and Wells, 1999]. Category theory 
provides a formal approach to process simply by the 
use of the arrow. It is inherently holistic and with in-
trinsic natural closure. Composability is a cornerstone 
of category theory [Asperti and Longo, 1991;Mac 
Lane, 1998]. Fundamental category theory suggests 
that for physical existence the real world operates as a 
Cartesian Closed Category. It can be shown [Rossiter 
et al., 2007] that any realizable system can be concep-
tually expressed using four interchangeable levels in 
categorical terms. The implicated categories are Carte-
sian Closed Categories (CCC) (Figure 2). 
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Fig 2: Natural composition of adjoint functors 
For matching across the levels in a contravariant 
manner, the intension e.g. SCH is defined with arrows 
of the form name type , while the extension e.g. 
DAT with arrows of the form value name . The four 
levels can be seen as two intension-extension pairs in 
Figure 3 (CPT/CST & SCH/DAT), that is con-
cepts/constructs and schema/data respectively. 
Before embarking on a full formal description of the 
architecture, some understanding and informal insight 
into its interpretation might be useful [Heather and 
Rossiter, 2001]. The architecture is constructed on 
four levels. Each type level taken with its adjacent 
type level acts as a level pair so that there are three 
level pairs across the four levels. This means that each 
point at each level is directly related to a point at the 
other level in the level pair. 
At the top level concepts relating to policy and phi-
losophy are defined. For example, object-oriented ab-
stractions are to be declared at this level. In principle, 
only one instance need be defined here. In a coherent 
system there can be only one collection of such types. 
With the open-ended nature of object-oriented struc-
tures, however some extensibility may be required. 
At the second level schema construction facilities 
are defined. Each system will have its own type defini-
tion. For example constructions would include record-
types as an aggregation of single- or multi-valued data 
field-types while relations would include table-types 
as an aggregation of single-valued data fields. 
At the third level the schema for each application is 
defined. There will clearly be many intensions defined 
in an organization, one for each application. Typing of 
names and other constraints will be applied to data 
objects and their methods.  
At the fourth level the data values for each applica-
tion are defined. There will be one collection of data 
values for each schema, the values being consistent 
with the types of names and constraints of the schema. 
Data values may be simple objects as in relations or 
complex objects as in computer-aided design and mul-
timedia systems. 
Between each level the mappings are strictly defined 
by their starting and terminating points in the respec-
tive level types. We look first at the mappings in the 
downward direction (decreasing abstraction). Between 
levels 1 and 2, Concepts CPT and Constructs CST, 
there is the mapping of type Policy P acting as a level 
pair. Between levels 2 and 3, Constructs CST and 
Schema SCH, there is the mapping of type Organiza-
tion O acting as a level pair. Between levels 3 and 4, 
Schema SCH and Data DAT, there is the mapping of 
type Instance I acting as a level pair. In the upward 
direction (increasing abstraction) there are the dual 
mappings Iop, Oop and Pop. 
For the authors, “…a system is held together by ad-
jointness…”. Interoperability is expressed as the ad-
jointness , , ,F G  where 1
L
GF  if and only if 
1
R
FG , as can be seen in Figure 4. Naturality is 
based on the ordering and interoperability of the two 
free and open represented category systems expressed 
in the form of CCC (triangles represent unique correla-
tion of components of the system – functors F and G 
are the free and underlying functor, respectively). The 
4-tuple above has four components: the free functor F, 
the underlying functor G, the unit of adjunction η and 
the counit of adjunction ε.  
In more detail adjointness characterizes the unique 
relationship between Cartesian Closed Categories (that 
is categories of real-world objects). There is a lower-
limit functor (F) that preserves co-limits and right-
adjoint to (F) is an upper-limit functor (G) which pre-
serves limits. 
Using adjointness between categories SCH and 
DAT as examples, the critical comparison is between 
the arrows f in category type SCH and the arrows g in 
category type DAT. It is defining the f  in terms of the 
functors F and G and the arrow g . We compare an 
object a with the result of G Fao , written simply as 
GFa , as assigned to category SCH. In effect an object 
in SCH is compared with the result obtained by apply-
ing functor F and then in turn functor G to the result. 
This comparison is a natural transformation η involv-
ing type changing: from a Fa GFa . This arrow η 
is called the unit of adjunction. The comparison is 
made in the context of the corresponding object Gb  
which maps b in DAT to SCH so that the condition of 
adjointness holds, that is 
a
Gg fo . 
 The perspective of the mapping f can be adjusted to 
that of the mapping g using the condition that 
b
Ff go . The arrow ε is the counit of adjunction 
and a natural transformation comparing FGb  to b. The 
view, based on equation solving, is that there is a func-
torial way to relate any arrow :g Fa b to an arrow 
:f a Gb in such a way that f solves the equation 
b
g Fyo and that the solution is unique for either 
some arrow y or object y in category SCH. 
Examples of left adjoints are enrichments such as 
taking a graph to a category, a set to a group, a set to a 
preorder and a collection of record keys to hashed ad-
dresses. The corresponding right adjoints qualitatively 
identify the enrichment, ensuring that a number of type 
restrictions are satisfied. 
The notation we use here for an adjunction is as fol-
lows. Consider an object a  in category SCH, an ob-
ject b  in category DAT and mappings: 
:F SCH DAT , :G DAT SCH .  
Then if there is an adjunction between F and G 
(F |G), we write the 4-tuple 
, , , :
a b
F G SCH DAT to indicate the free func-
tor, underlying functor, unit of adjunction and counit 
of adjunction respectively. 
From an application viewpoint, a useful view of an 
adjunction is that of insertion in a constrained envi-
ronment. The unit η can be thought of as quantitative 
creation, the counit ε as qualitative validation. There is 
then a relationship between the left and right adjoints 
such that η represents quantitative identification and ε 
qualitative identification. 
In Figure 2 each level pair involves two functors for 
example P and Pop, O and O
op
, I and I
op
. I and I
op
 
represent instantiation and naming, O and O
op 
organi-
zation and meta and P and P
op 
policy and metameta, 
respectively. If the system is coherent adjointness will 
hold between each pair of functors involved in a level 
pair and between any compositions of functors across 
the level pairs, as shown in Figure 2.  
5  Security in Terms of Category 
Theory 
The facets of Figure 1 are formally defined in cate-
gory theory as follows.  A 'requirement' is an underly-
ing functor; 'policy' is a natural transformation; a 
'mechanism' is an appropriate functor such as a cova-
riant functor for a 'service' and a contravariant functor 
for an 'attack'; a 'channel' is some arrow that in catego-
ry theory needs to be properly defined. The verbs 
'corresponds to', 'materialized through', 'implemented 
by', 'protect against' and 'targets to' are all features of 
adjointness which would allow formal typing of the 
various components. The archetypal levels of Figure 3 
are needed to dimensionalize the full structural form 
corresponding to the systems language of Figure 1. 
Category theory provides higher-order facilities for 
handling global security. In such a framework, every 
local solution can be integrated with others, to have 
the whole view ultimately. Thus, a system can be de-
signed initially in a secure manner following a holistic 
approach (top-down view), which can be enhanced 
subsequently by further effective security solutions 
including those focusing on raising security awareness 
by minimizing human errors (bottom-up approach). 
 
6  The Proposed Framework 
The proposed Holistic Security Framework is devel-
oped in two parallel stages. In order to define the high 
levels of the framework (stage 1), objects and object 
hierarchies (presented in the form of UML diagrams) 
are categorified into categories. Current analytical 
techniques used for representing security techniques 
such as UML and CORBA are expressible over only 
two or three levels of the architecture shown in Figure 
3 so they lack the systemic closure of the categorical 
approach. But at least we must show that all the basics 
from the object-oriented paradigm notions, such as 
inheritance, polymorphism, polyinstatiation, and col-
lections are included in our categorification as all of 
them are well-expressed using UML. 
In stage 2, the inner complexity of each of the levels 
and the mappings between them are described, follow-
ing the ‘process’ approach of the distributed system 
itself [Rossiter et al., 2006]. By following this ap-
proach, we must show the event-ordering in local and 
global conditions in a clear way, as DIS communica-
tion including that relevant for security purposes takes 
place between processes by exchanging messages. 
Such exchange means that first-order predicate calcu-
lus, which serves well for local security problems, is 
not enough for a systemic approach, in complex envi-
ronments, as found for example in the Internet.  
It is not easy to give an example of a security solu-
tion that is relevant to the current ideas. This is be-
cause current solutions, top-down and bottom-up, are 
either platform-based, language-based or service-
based. Consequently such solutions are still local and 
partial.  
 
6.1 The Process Approach 
A distributed computation M ( { , }M P W ), through 
its lifetime, is composed of a dynamic group of 
processes ( 1 2{ , ,..., }nP p p p ) running on different 
resources and sites expressed in the form of a group of 
communication channels W. The processes (P) have a 
disjoint address space and communicate with each 
other by message passing via W using a variety of me-
chanisms, including unicast and multicast. While these 
processes form a single, fully connected logical entity, 
low-level communication connections (e.g. TCP/IP 
sockets) may be created and destroyed dynamically 
during program execution. 
Parallel computations that acquire multiple compu-
tational resources introduce the need to establish secu-
rity relationships not simply between a client and a 
server, but among potentially a hundred or more 
processes that may span many administrative domains 
(e.g. computational grids). The communication chan-
nels between correct processes are authenticated and 
protect the integrity and secrecy (privacy). The activity 
of each sequential process is modeled as executing a 
sequence of events. A sequence of all the events in a 
process constitutes a local history. A global history of 
the computation contains all the events. In an asyn-
chronous system, information may flow from one 
event to another either because the two events are of 
the same process and thus may access the same local 
state, or because the two events are of different 
processes and they correspond to the exchange of a 
message [Coulouris et al., 2005]. A binary relation 
' '  (“happens before”) over the events of the system 
can be defined in order to express the sequential 
process of events. Certain events of the global history 
may be causally unrelated. For two distinct events e 
and e , neither e e nor e e is true. Such events 
are called ‘concurrent’, written as || 'e e .  
Recent work with category theory has shown its po-
tential in relating process order to notional time 
through the adjointness between monad and comonad 
categories [Heather et al., 2008].   
 
6.2   Integrating top-down and bottom-
up approaches with Category 
Theory 
The holistic security architecture, in categorical terms, 
can be visualized as mappings between pairs of adjoint 
functors with abstractions derived from the analysis of 
the current research. Thus, a process, that is a group 
process, or a distributed transaction (e.g. a distributed 
computation as a group of processes, each one consist-
ing of a series of events) can be broken up into a series 
of composed adjoints to give the power and flexibility 
of a modular approach. For example, local extensio-
nalities such as local security policies are intercon-
nected one with another through global intentionality 
as in a global security policy or meta-policy frame-
work by integrating local slice categories within local 
policy security domains where each one corresponds 
to a specific security policy. 
Following the bottom-up view, the applied mechan-
isms and controls can be evaluated against security 
policies, security services and security controls. In the 
other direction a parallel top-down view provides an 
insight of the desirable security level of the system 
based on the CIA security principles, applied during 
the design of the system. The integration of the two 
approaches is the heart of a global, systemic view for 
handling security in distributed information systems. It 
provides the flexibility to draw the boundaries of the 
applied security in the distributed system. At the same 
time, the system can be re-configured, based on the 
behavior of the unit and co-unit of each of the adjunc-
tions in the mappings between the levels (Figure 5). 
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7 Conclusions 
Current security approaches like baseline approaches, 
risk management etc. are characterized by their locali-
ty. They are based on axiomatic set theory. Security 
for modern, complex and usually heterogeneous distri-
buted information systems is based on higher order 
activities. 
The results of this current project show that global 
security for interoperability across heterogeneous dis-
tributed information systems can benefit from the use 
of category theory. A holistic, modular security ap-
proach provides natural closure and follows the 
‘process’ approach of the distributed system itself.  The 
proposed framework is in two stages, the first involv-
ing categorification of objects and object hierarchies in 
the form of UML diagrams and the second a detailed 
investigation of event-ordering in the processes in-
volved.  
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Fig 3: Four levels defined with contravariant functors and 
intension-extension pairs 
Fig 4: Adjointness between two systems  
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